Facts of cripness to the Brazilian: dialogues with Avatar, the film by Mello, Anahi Guedes de & Gavério, Marco Antonio
 
Anuário Antropológico 
v.44 n.1 | 2019
2019/v.44 n.1
Facts of cripness to the Brazilian: dialogues with 
Avatar, the film







Programa de Pós-Graduação em Antropologia Social (UnB)
Edição impressa





Anahi Guedes de Mello e Marco Antonio Gavério, «Facts of cripness to the Brazilian: dialogues with 
Avatar, the film», Anuário Antropológico [Online], v.44 n.1 | 2019, posto online no dia 06 julho 2019,
consultado o 28 abril 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/aa/3481 ; DOI: https://doi.org/
10.4000/aa.3481 
Anuário Antropológico is licensed under a Creative Commons Atribuição-Uso Não-Comercial-Proibição
de realização de Obras Derivadas 4.0 International.
43
Anuário Antropológico volume 44, n.1, 2019, 43-65
Anahi Guedes de Mello e Marco Antonio Gavério
Facts of cripness to the Brazilian: 
dialogues with Avatar, the film
Anahi Guedes de Mello
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina - Brasil
 Marco Antonio Gavério
Universidade Federal de São Carlos - Brasil 
Introduction
Queer theory influenced disability studies, contributing towards the emergence 
of crip theory, proposed by Robert McRuer (2006), which relates cultural signs of 
queerness and disability. While the main axiom of queer theory postulates that con-
temporary society is governed by hetero-cis-normativity, crip theory builds itself 
upon the postulate of compulsory able-bodiedness of the social structure less sensi-
tive to body diversity. The translation of the term crip, short for cripple, for the cat-
egory of “aleijado” in Portuguese, is a way of approximating its definition in English. 
The meaning of the term crip initially was directed against all that does not fit within 
bodily/functional standards. It reveals the abject zone reserved for persons with 
disabilities. Similar to the term “queer”, crip terminology has an openly aggres-
sive, derogatory and subversive connotation. In order to mark a crip commitment 
towards developing an analytics of the normalization of the body, inspired by the 
work of deconstructionist authors like Michel Foucault (1990), Jacques Derrida 
(1998), Judith Butler (1990, 1993, 2004), among others, developing critiques 
around systems of oppression marked by patriarchy, by compulsory heterosexual-
ity1 (Rich, 1980) and the compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer, 2002):
I argue that the system of compulsory able-bodiedness that produces disability is 
thoroughly interwoven with the system of compulsory heterosexuality that pro-
duces queerness; that – in fact – compulsory heterosexuality is contingent on 
compulsory able-bodiedness and vice versa. […] The idea of imbricated systems 
is of course not new – Rich’s own analysis repeatedly stresses the imbrication 
of compulsory heterosexuality and patriarchy. I would argue, however, as others 
have, the feminist and queer theories (and cultural theories generally) are not yet 
accustomed to figuring ability/disability into the equation, and thus this theory of 
compulsory able-bodiedness is offered as a preliminary contribution to that much-
-needed conversation (McRuer, 2002: 89).
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According to McRuer, it’s not possible to speak of “persons with disabilities”, 
once crip theory stands in relation to disability, as queer stands towards homosex-
uality and transsexuality. That is, a radical critique of institutionalized categories by 
normativity. Meaning, crip theory deconstructs the boundaries between disabled 
and non-disabled persons, suggesting that we are all, one way or another, in the 
same situation, enabling us to break down barriers between “us” and “them”2.
In Anthropology, we learn that social relationships are built on binary catego-
ries, so we propose the use of crip theory as another way of thinking about dis-
ability in order to deconstruct the binary logic “disability/ability”. This is the per-
spective guiding this study. Since our interest is not in the Goffmanesque social 
processes that sociologically create people with disabilities as stigmatized or labeled 
as “deviant” (Goffman, 1963), but focuses on the debate of disability from one queer 
perspective. It questions the “normalizing processes marked by the simultaneous 
production of hegemonic and of subaltern”3 (Miskolci, 2009: 171).
The main objective is to problematize the production of “truths” about disability, 
departing from crip theory. For this deconstruction, we critically analyzed “Avatar”, 
a science fiction movie, and its representation of the disabled body. What we find 
interesting in using “Avatar’s” approach is that it allows us to make some mention 
of the analytical and intersectional potential of a crip epistemology of disability. To 
this cultural discussion, we will link some of its aspects to a perspective autoeth-
nographical in which the authors bring their respective personal narratives as dis-
abled, exercising one cripistemological way to analyze both their bodies as their 
own dichotomy disability/ability. The expression “autoethnographical” refers to 
autoethnography, a form of “self-writing” (Foucault, 1992) that combines char-
acteristics of autobiography and ethnography, describing and analyzing (graphy) 
personal (auto) experience in order to understand the cultural experience (ethno) 
(Ellis, 2004; Holman Jones, 2005) of people with disabilities. In this sense, having 
the researcher’s body as a simultaneous mediator between the observer and the 
observed, autoethnography implies the exposition of a vulnerable self (Ellis & 
Bochner, 2000), precisely because it is “an autobiographical genre of writing and 
research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to 
the cultural” (Idem, ibidem, p. 739).
The fundamental idea is to show that the social production of disability is also 
“naturalized” by the dominant knowledge, whose meanings attributed to disability 
are organized in an apparent binary opposition system to the notions of disability 
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and ability, in which the presence of disability supposedly is due the clear lack of 
ability. Therefore, in a queer/crip analytical disability and ability are revealed as 
interdependent.
Avatar, the film: an anthropological narrative, queer and crip
Avatar (2009), a film directed by James Cameron, is a fictional film work per-
meated by hybrid and mythological narratives. The story is set in the year 2156 on 
Pandora, one of the moons of Polyphemus planet, in a region covered by lush flora, 
luminescence, and dense with giant plants that shrink. In Pandora’s forest there is 
also a rich, mythologically exotic and monstrous fauna (Oliveira, 2011), and its 
local inhabitants, the Na’vi people, blue humanoids about three meters high, having 
long limbs, a tail, a long braid of black hair4, ears and nose resemble a feline whose 
ways of life inspired a profusion of mythologies and religious influences:
[...] The Na’vi culture condensed resonance of mythologies and various religious 
influences, ranging from pantheism to tecnopaganism also visiting monotheism, 
African religiousness and shamanism, and even reincarnationism, to the taste of 
the beliefs of miscegenation that makes part notably the Latin American universe5 
(Oliveira, 2011: 4).
In the midst of the paradise of Pandora images, the soldier Jake Sully, a former 
Marine, is the paralyzed twin brother of the scientist dead shortly before complet-
ing the scientific experiment called Avatar. Sully, by having identical genome to his 
brother, is appointed to replace him. Following the team of scientists, the former 
soldier gets lost during the expedition and ends up contacting Neytiri, daughter 
of Eytukan, the head of the Omaticaya clan, and Mo’at, shaman and legitimate 
representative of Eywa6. Neytiri, about to kill him, receives a signal of Eywa, the 
Great Mother, not to do this. Then Jake is conducted by Neytiri and other Na’vi 
warriors to her village. After a tense moment, the head of the clan says, “This is the 
first warrior walker we see. We need to learn more about it”. The Omaticaya clan 
decided then to give a chance to Jake to learn the ways of the Na’vi, to speak the 
native language and to walk like one. From there, Jake spends three months learn-
ing the ways of the Na’vi and goes through all the rites of initiation to become a 
Na’vi warrior: he learns to ride, hunt, respect and love. In this deep relationship 
with the tribe, Sully has been accepted by its members as one of them. This cycle 
is completed a passion for Neytiri. Gradually Jake is delighted with the natives and 
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realizes the emptiness of his life as a paraplegic with no prospect in the human “civ-
ilized” world and begins to question Western values  and himself. Sit torn between 
two worlds, the loyalty to Colonel Quaritch, to whom he must transmit all the 
information about the Na’vi, and the loyalty that keeps him increasingly linked to 
Omaticaya clan. All this was because Jake understood the culture, the native thought 
the other under a perspectivistic bias:
We must learn that we have a body [the body of your avatar Na’vi], and this learn-
ing in the case of Jake Sully will take you to “see” and “feel” of another way, until 
it is no longer the “driver” and start to think with his own body. Until your mind 
and your values  are converted into a “point of experience”, a perspectivism and 
radical “point of view” amending our own experience of world and the separa-
tion between subject and object. In this sense, Avatar can be read as a conversion 
of instrumental reason and the body/mind dualism to a “thought of the body”, 
in which the body point of view radically changes our identity and subjectivity7 
(Bentes, 2010: 73).
Avatar is anthropologically inspired by the indigenous populations, with a cos-
mology in the mold of Amerindian perspectivism proposed by Eduardo Viveiros 
de Castro (1996), where lifestyles are totally subject to the holistic laws of nature. 
For example, they produce, collect and hunt without the intention of generat-
ing surplus, still have a social organization divided among the warriors, the chief 
and spiritual leader of the clan. Amerindian perspectivism as a concept emerges in 
Levi-Straussian-inspired Indigenous Ethnology from “savage thinking” (Lévi-Strauss, 
1989) and has another meaning with the “ontological turn” in Anthropology when 
Viveiros de Castro defines it as a “way of thinking that rejects dualisms typical 
of Western-modern thought”8. (Barcelos Neto et al., 2006: 177). Thus, “it is the 
conception common to many peoples of the continent, according to which the 
world is inhabited by different kinds of subjects or persons, human and non-hu-
man, who apprehend it from different points of view”9 (Viveiros de Castro, 1996: 
115). Hence, in the perspectivist conception, “[...] the classical distinction between 
Nature and Culture cannot be used to describe dimensions or domains internal to 
non-Western cosmologies without first passing through a rigorous ethnological cri-
tique”10 (Viveiros de Castro, 1996, loc. cit.).
Interestingly, parallel to this body/mind dualism, another background perme-
ates Avatar narrative: the duality disability/ability is the thread of the plot, whose 
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“essence” is connected to the artificiality of the machines. It is precisely this binary 
opposition which serves as a starting point to crip theory, leading us to the debate 
on bodily perfection that McRuer (2006) calls “full physical capacity”.
Jake Sully character lives in crisis between two worlds, human and Na’vi. As a 
human, Sully is despised by his abject condition invalid veteran, impure, depraved 
and disabled; as Na’vi is chosen by his perfection, purity and courage. At first, 
the human form of Jake, as being raw and disabled, prevails. But it is slowly being 
replaced by the “pure essence Na’vi”. Consequently, the victory occurs at the 
expense of “brutal and defective essence” having as extreme paradigm Colonel 
Quaritch. In this sense, the Avatar’s narrative incorporates the demands of our 
Western capitalist ableist society by heroes, being able to transcend the bodily lim-
itations and achieve great deeds. 
The metaphor of the colonial context between indigenous peoples of the Ameri-
cas and Oceania and their European invaders is explicit when the narrative of Avatar 
introduces a former Marine who, like a Na’vi, dreams of flying over dense forests 
freely, but upon waking as a human faces his harsh reality as a wheelchair user, dis-
abled. As a human, Jake is on Earth in a futuristic and dystopian moment, but a 
future that has not yet been able to “eradicate” disability even with all the advances 
of “science”. In a passage from the film, Sully says:
They can fix a spinal, if you got the money, but not on vet benefits, not in this 
economy. A VA check and 12 bucks will get you a cup of coffee. I’m what they 
call... waitlisted. The Bengal Tiger, extinct for over a century is making a come-
back. These cloned tiger cubs at the Beijing Zoo are the latest of a number of 
species that have been cloned back into existence in the past five years. 
We wonder about the interests behind Pandora and its resources and, through-
out the movie, we realize that science, militarization and capitalism are mixed in the 
exploration of the moon and Earth may no longer have enough energy resources. 
This is a dystopian future that is in the plot of the science fiction Avatar. However, 
even this plot could tell us about a “cultural shock”, recognizable in a colonial 
fashion to the anthropological gaze - echoing the distinctions nature x culture, tra-
dition x modernity, individual x society and body x mind - the film portrays a “sci-fi 
colonial shock”, effectively the assault of one species from one galaxy to another. In 
this way, the Western colonial process also created its “scientific fictions” by assum-
ing that other peoples were inferior to the inhabitants of Earth. To what extent 
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does the concept of human take shape? Could not our idea of “original humanity” 
come from a colonial mix that has been processing the term through science, deadly 
weapons, and capital?
Avatar’s dystopia lies in this imminent end of the human species and the condi-
tions of existence on planet Earth. Jake Sully has the DNA needed to take over the 
place of his twin brother scientist, but as an invalid ex-military man he has nothing 
to lose either. “Have nothing to lose”, if we comprehend this phrase through a 
crip reading of the futuristic disabilities projections, according to Kafer (2013), we 
have two situations of “fictional space-time”. The first posits the utopian promise 
of a world without disabilities, without diseases, without ills and sufferings; The 
second projects a dystopia, a future environment in which disability and disease 
have not yet been eradicated and may even become more pronounced due to the 
very ambiguous nature of technoscience, that is, at the same time that it is the great 
paradox which has effectively extended human life expectancy, few people access 
these resources satisfactorily. In the case of the movie Avatar, the dystopia that Sully 
literally embodies is not only individual and techno-medical, it is economic also, as 
when Jake comments that genetics can reproduce an extinct tiger, but his spine has 
not been repaired because he cannot pay for the procedure with his pension as a war 
veteran. Jake Sully then rejects his body and decides that, like Na’vi, he has nothing 
to lose by walking back into another body. However, the character Jake Sully is not 
a symbol of the disabled activist, nor proud of his wheelchair and thin legs. Nor 
would it be just a disability studies scholar who sees Sully’s disability as a social, 
political and theoretical experience. Sully understands that he has a hole in his life 
and that his disability is synonymous with a disintegrated body, flawed and marked 
by absences. Hence, Jake allows himself to be seduced by the Colonel’s promise that 
if he reported the information about Pandora to his military superiors, he would 
have “his legs back.” However, Sully is also seduced by the body of his Na’vi avatar. 
This Avatar movie review aims to make a didactic and brief introduction to crip 
theory, to make a point to the abjection processes of disabled bodies. In this case, 
the subversive power of the abject body of crip theory is linked to processes of 
subjection of disability to able-bodied hegemonic patterns because disability is the 
materiality of abjection in its most radical sense:
Yet there is a strange and really unaccountable silence when the issue of disabil-
ity is raised (or, more to the point never raised); the silence is stranger, too, since 
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so much of left criticism has devoted itself to the issue of the body, of the social 
construction of sexuality and gender. Alternative bodies people this discourse: 
gay, lesbian, hermaphrodite [sic], criminal, medical, and so on. But lurking behind 
these images of transgression and deviance is a much more transgressive and 
deviant figure: the disabled body (Davis, 1995: 5).
In this sense, the disabled body refers to the idea of crippled as disturbing, degen-
erated, disposable, morbid, revolting, disgusting, in short, disability is the totalizing 
synthesis of the aberration of the monster figure (Gil, 1994; Silva, 2000). However, 
for the crip project, the distinction between disability and ability, registered only 
in the so disgusting figure of the disabled body, can’t be effectively achieved due 
to the impossibility of achieving the full physical capacity, or “disability is a natural 
part of life. Everyone will be disabled someday” (Pfeiffer, 1999:106). Furthermore, 
it is not enough to make positive this universal and virtual projection of disability. 
As Robert McRuer (2006) points out, not all people who can be considered dis-
abled voluntarily fit in this politically resignified category, especially people who are 
already considered “not disabled” and who tend to understand, ultimately, that the 
disabled body is itself the proper example, the great metaphor of the flawed condi-
tion of vulnerable, finite and unwanted humanity. Here prefigures the critical and 
crip conceptualization of a severely disabled position. According to McRuer (2006),
[…] everyone is virtually disabled, both in the sense that able-bodied norms are 
“intrinsically impossible to embody” fully and in the sense that able-bodied status 
is always temporary, disability being the one identity category that all people will 
embody if they live long enough. What we might call a critically disabled position, 
however, would differ from such a virtually disabled position; it would call atten-
tion to the ways in which the disability rights movement and disability studies have 
resisted the demands of compulsory able-bodiedness and have demanded access 
to a newly imagined and newly configured public sphere where full participation 
is not contingent on an able body (McRuer, 2006: 30-31).
This severely disabled position does not seem to get the same weight when we think 
of abject materiality of the deaf body inhabited by Anahi. To give an example, we illus-
trate Anahi’s remarkable ethnographic experience with a person with Down syndrome, 
which occurred at Galeão International Airport, Rio de Janeiro, coming from Recife, 
where she participated from 11 to 13 October 2012 at the invitation of the Ministry of 
Education (MEC) of Brazil, to the VI Brazilian Congress on Down Syndrome:
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I was sitting waiting for the flight to Florianopolis when suddenly I saw two faces. 
The first was a face of a person who I had just met at this event, but there was no 
time for greetings. Soon after, I see the second person’s face. An unknown face that 
instantly disturbed my eyes in time and space, revealing the power of fascination 
for me: a woman with Down syndrome walked alone and in high heeled shoes, 
with astonishing ease. She walked by, disappearing from sight in a few seconds. I 
was staring at the body with Down syndrome walking in high heels, an ability that 
I do not own, and suddenly I thought about my own prejudice, simply because the 
owner of the high-heeled shoes is a woman with Down syndrome “independent” 
and “alone” because she wasn’t accompanied. (Anahi’s field diary, October 2012).
Thinking of a hierarchy of extraordinary bodies (Garland-Thomson, 1997), I, 
Anahi, a deaf body, I experienced an extraordinary moment that Rosemarie Gar-
land-Thomson (2009) calls staring, a persistent fascination for the disabled body, 
feeling the threshold between the sacred and the profane (Douglas, 1966), because 
at first glance the deaf body is configured in an “ideal body”, i.e. a kind of disabled 
body that approaches the ideas of ordinary bodies. In this unexpected episode, I was 
the ordinary body; woman with Down syndrome, the extraordinary body:
Extraordinary-looking bodies demand attention. The sight of an unexpected body 
- that is to say, a body that does not conform to our expectations for an ordi-
nary body - is compelling because it disorders expectations. Such disorder is at 
once novel and disturbing. This interruption of expectations, of the visual status 
quo, attracts interest but can also lead to disgust, according to William Ian Miller 
(1997). Unusual bodies are “unsettling because they are disordering; they undo the 
complacency that comes with disattendability; they force us to look and notice, 
or to suffer self-consciousness about looking or not looking. They introduce alarm 
and anxiety by virtue of their power to horrify and disgust.” Such bodies fascinate; 
they demand that we “sneak a second look” […] (Garland-Thomson, 2009: 37).
In this sense, although the deaf body provokes fascination through social markers 
that identify (sign language, the “deaf voice”, cochlear implants etc.), it seems to 
cause less disgust than a Down syndrome body or an amputated or quadriplegic 
body. Also, my brief stay in Recife, when I closely witnessed desires, flirtations and 
expressions of public affection among many couples with Down syndrome, this led 
me to compare the Down syndrome bodies to gay and lesbian bodies when they are 
not in repressive environments where they feel more comfortable publicly express-
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ing their affections. In fact, beyond the “compulsory heterosexuality” (Rich, 1980), 
we also have the “compulsory able-bodiedness” (McRuer, 2002).
Marco tells of an experience in which he realized that his “pride” of his “wheel-
chair body” – half human, half machine – could not be easily understood in certain 
contexts:
I, as a wheelchair user for 18 years, feel part wheelchair, a cyborg. The symbiosis 
that I make with her makes me realize the world and reach it with my body-chair. 
A body that runs, that disassembles, that disengages and engages again in other 
positions, in other places and contexts. How can I deny that my chair and I are 
part of each other, thus deny that my being has wheels and engine? A few months 
ago I got a ride with a friend to a party. Upon arriving at the public parking, we 
had difficulties opening the car trunk, which only opened from the inside, to with-
draw my wheelchair. Maybe our internal movements in the car looked suspicious 
at that hour of night and some security guards approached us. I was in the car, dis-
mantled in the passenger’s seat while listening to my friend arguing with one of 
them: “I am trying to open the trunk to take out my friend’s chair, he is a wheel-
chair user.”11 One of the guards immediately shot back: “Wheelchair user?! What 
is a wheelchair user doing here? This is no place for him!” (Marco’s field diary, 
September 10, 2015).
The “severely disabled” critique of the second author confronts the anxieties that 
the figure of a disabled person provokes. Why can’t they be there? Because of the 
parking lot is at a Brazilian public university? Because it was at a party? Because the 
wheelchair testifies the frailty of human beings? The point is that no one wants to 
take a politically disabled experience as telos of their identity. Yet as much as “[...] if 
we live long enough, we will all become disabled (Garland-Thomson, 2009: 46)”, 
the wheelchair, as well as crutches, walkers and oxygen atoms pipes are not com-
monly designated as “dreams of consumption” or totally stripped of its medical and 
hospital symbology.
This ambiguous figure of the wheel-chair-body – between the healthy and the 
sick; between life and death; between imprisonment and the freedom of technology; 
between human and non-human – is the one that brings the idea of  “inadequacy” and 
“transgression”. Transgression that creates anxieties, like the figure of cyborg analyzed 
by Donna Haraway (1987: 5)12, because of the breakup with the image of Western 
ontological distinction between body and machine. In the words of Haraway,
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a cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of 
social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, 
our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction. […] Con-
temporary science fiction is full of cyborgs — creatures simultaneously animal and 
machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted. Modern medicine 
is also full of cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine, each conceived 
as coded devices, in an intimacy and with a power that was not generated in the 
history of sexuality (Haraway, 1987: 1-2).
Disability as stigma and experience queer/crip
For many people with disabilities, especially those born with a disability or who 
acquired disability at an early age, disability is often the first queer experience, long 
before the gender and sexuality13. The disabled body is queer. It’s a dissident cor-
poreality. The metaphor of “the crippled” shows the proximity of the “monster” of 
queer theory with the “monster” of crip theory. There is a “crip hierarchy” of queer 
bodies. Therefore, we must crip queer theory to include subaltern voices of dis-
abled persons, deconstructing the hegemonic assumption that only LGBT bodies 
are likely to “queering”.
In The Body Silent, Robert Murphy (1987) discusses the deviance models of dis-
ability in Talcott Parsons and Erving Goffman. According to this author, especially 
Parsons did not consider what happens when the patient neither does not dies nor 
gets better, theorizing the fact that people who acquire a disability enter into a 
permanent liminal state between health and illness. In other words, the discussion 
of disability is relegated to the background of discussions on rational and deviant 
models the health and sickness. About the interactionist theory of Goffman, Murphy 
argues that
Erving Goffman’s stigma had great influence on the sociological study of disabil-
ity by providing a common framework within which the handicapped, criminals, 
and certain minority groups could be seen as sharing a common lot: They are 
all outsiders, deviants from social norms. There are, however, problems with this 
framework. First of all, it throws into one pot people who are deliberate viola-
tors of legal or moral standards and persons who are in no way to blame for their 
stigmatized state. A person chooses to follow a life of crime, but nobody asks to 
be born a black, and certainly nobody wants to become a quadriplegic. These sta-
tions in life are visited upon people by inheritance or bad luck, not through choice. 
This, of course, does not prevent others from blaming the victim, and all too 
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many benighted whites look on blacks as lazy and unintelligent people who prefer 
welfare and crime to working for a living. Even the disabled are often vaguely 
blamed for their condition, or at least for not achieving maximum recovery. And 
as sure proof that they bear stigmatized identities, physical impairment is looked 
upon as something that does not happen to respectable people. The blind are folks 
who make brooms in sheltered workshops, or who sit on street corners with cups. 
They certainly do not belong among the upwardly mobile (Murphy, 1987: 129).
In fact, the concept of stigma strongly influenced sociological studies on disabil-
ity by providing a framework in which “disabled”, “criminals” and other minority 
groups would present “common destiny”: all are outsiders and deviant social norms. 
However, to Murphy (1987), this frame also presents problems by putting together 
and classifying as “stigmatized” people who deliberately violate legal or moral norms 
with those who have no blame for their condition. A person can choose to follow a 
life of crime, but no one asks to be born black, much less choose to become quad-
riplegic. These are events that occur through inheritance or “bad luck”. If to be dis-
abled is less of a “choice” and more about “bad luck”, or vice versa, it expands the 
scope of the stigma concept, to exchange their conventional content by another 
sense of its meaning, especially in the context of “politics of appearance” as pro-
posed by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2009) to refer to the “abominations of the 
body” described by Goffman as “stigmata hierarchy” that begins with disabilities:
[…] Human variation, in other words, is seldom neutral. “Abominations of the 
body” are in the eye of the well-acculturated beholder. Modern culture’s erasure 
of mortality and its harbinger, bodily vulnerability, make disabled bodies seem 
extraordinary rather than ordinary, abnormal instead of mundane - even though 
in fact the changes in our function and form that we think of as disabilities are 
the common effects of living and are fundamental to the human condition. What 
Goffman describes as “abominations” come to most ordinary lives eventually. If we 
live long enough, we will all become disabled (Garland-Thomson, 2009: 44-46).
Here there is a relationship between Goffman’s concept of stigma (stigmatized 
bodies) and the idea of abjection (abject bodies) of queer theory. The hierarchy 
of corporealities, including the “abominations of the body” and all the contrasts 
between ordinary and extraordinary bodies (Garland-Thomson, 1997), organizes 
the able-bodiedness of our social structure little sensitive to body diversity.
For queer thought, all “difference than [if] want to be assimilated or tolerated, 
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and therefore its form of action is much more transgressive and disturbing”14 (Louro, 
2001: 546), may also be considered queer. From this perspective, disabled bodies 
are also queer. The “invention of disability” also produces an “exclusionary matrix” 
that “requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings” (Butler, 
1993: 3). By abject we understand the subjects whose bodies do not fit the pre-
vailing social standards. For Butler (1990), the “abnormal” is seen as the “constitu-
tive outside” of the subject “normal” and just designates the “uninhabitable” areas of 
social life. These zones of abjection are densely populated by those who do not enjoy 
of a subject hierarchy, there is a need to constitute a “foreign” composed of “not 
subject” in order to prove as less human for such a matrix can remain hegemonic. 
However, as with the queer/crip bodies of the “global south”, disability also 
needs “to be understood in the context of the violence of colonization and neoco-
lonial power” (Connell, 2011: 1369). From this “southern perspective,” we should 
think of Jake Sully as a “settler of the north” seduced by the “colonized from the 
south”. How to access “southern bodies” if Sully is from the “north” and, above all, 
by his position of geopolitically localized subject, let himself be seduced by the other 
when he assumed the body of his Na’vi avatar. How do the bodies of the authors 
of this paper enter the “moral economy” of southern bodies to think of the “global 
north”? Are we necessarily from the south because we are Brazilian or are in Brazil? 
For Viveiros de Castro (2002), the other can be understood as possibility of relating 
to something beyond the self. In this sense, the other is the structure in which the 
self imagines the existence of other. For this reason, we recognize our position as 
“southern bodies” in constant tension between being in the “global south” and being 
in the “Brazilian academic north”: in the first case we are post colonized Brazilians, 
in analogy to the metaphor of being Na’vi in a context of global binary division of 
the world; in the second case we are in good federal universities of the “center” 
(represented by the states that compose the southeastern, south and central-west 
regions of Brazil), enjoying relative academic autonomy and material resources for 
the research and production of knowledge about disability, so that we are often 
interpreted by the “academic periphery” (represented by the states that make up 
the northern and northeastern regions of the country) as “settlers” of certain social 
thoughts about disability.
In the next section, we will focus on “cripness” of our autobiographical narratives 
that permeate the crip politicization of our disabled body to Avatar fiction: Marco as 
a body attached to a wheelchair and being carrier of a genetic disease; and Anahi’s 
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deaf body connected to a cochlear implant. In the perspective of prosthetic narra-
tive, the connection of Avatar with our disabled bodies is supported by the notion 
of the hybrid. The hybridization of Sully human and Sully Na’vi helps us to speak of 
our hybrid condition physically-disabled-wheelchair-body and deaf-cochlear-im-
planted-body respectively.
My body, my wheelchair 
The fact that I’m a motorized-wheelchair-body, goes beyond the fact that I was 
a “user of a motorized wheelchair” or a “person on a wheelchair”. The first memory 
I have about wheelchair comes with my refusal and fear, as a child, to not become 
‘it’s’ “prisoner”. I grew up hearing that one of the effects of “my genetic condi-
tion” would be the progressive loss of all muscle tone. One of the major medical 
concerns, that served as a rehabilitative motto for my incurable clinical prognos-
tics, was to keep my degenerating body as “active and independent” as possible. Be 
“active and independent” meant keeping up my ability to walk, and my standing 
position, with a lot of physiotherapy and psychology.
Amid these discourses, the inevitable feeling of weakness consumed me all the 
more: I could no longer hold my eight-year-old body standing for long; my arms 
were trying in vain to sustain me under the crutches that had, up until that time, 
accompanied me. With every failed, flawed step, every time I lost muscle control 
in my legs, leading to an inevitable fall to the ground, it became less painful to see 
myself as a “wheelchair bound”. I tried hard not to use ‘it’. I saw the wheelchair as 
a “prison” that would not allow me to do anything; but, at the same time, I did not 
see with the same “critical concern” the heavy iron structure that embraced my legs 
and hip and that was the last “prosthetic therapy” to save my bipedalism (seen as an 
index of greater independence).
As my muscle degeneration is inevitable, as well as the loss of my ability to walk, 
the heavy paraphernalia that helped me to keep standing up. The “dreaded” wheel-
chair was the only way for me to continue playing around and going to school. 
Gradually the process by which I stopped seeing “it” involves me in a simultaneous 
metaphorical and literal process as I felt that “she” embraced me with “her” arms 
and metal supports and foam, which held me up and off the ground. I perceived 
it as another way to move around, to communicate with others. To find a way of 
living “stuck” in an apparatus seen as culturally malevolent, allowed me, over time, 
to create a symbiosis with this machine.
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My wheelchair is not exactly a possession, it, she became the fundamental means 
of my own condition of social existence, including as a “disabled person”. As she, it 
and I we were inappropriate for many spaces; she and I were, and are, a cybernetic 
hybrid configuration, as Haraway (1987) defines cyborgs. There is no presence of 
one without the other. The apparent simple act of dismounting “my” wheelchair 
starts at the exact moment that we are tortuously uncoupled for it to be folded, 
defragmented in parts to fit in a car’s trunk. This disassemblage consumes me in the 
anxiety of our distance. I feel inert to be outside of her and I wonder what my “real” 
legs are paired with the momentary stillness of the chair’s wheels. In this mixture 
of flesh, bone, metal, plastic, and electricity, I feel a motorized-wheelchair-body, a 
rolling-body, a mechanical organism disfigured of its supposed essences.
What makes me disabled? The wheelchair? The perception of others about my 
body? My degenerative disease that leaves me “cock high in the world” (Mairs, 2001: 
54). The world that does not include bodies extremely out of social, cultural, and 
biological norms and expectations? What comes first? Donna Haraway’s cyborg 
refers to a noise in the cultural and scientific certainties of human ontology, and 
allows us to think as ambiguous beings, indeterminate or multiple sources. To prefer 
the idea of being a cyborg instead of a goddess (Haraway, 1987; Meekosha, 1999; 
Puar, 2012) the author tenses a critical idea of embodied consciousness by devices 
and power techniques historically locatable. The possibility of (un)learning the body 
emerges not only as a means of meeting a pre-existing world, but also to create new 
bodies-worlds contingent to each other.
My cochlear implant, my crip sex toy
My deaf body, my cochlear implant. My cochlear implant, my crip sex toy. My 
crip sex toy, my subjectivity. I do not have the primacy of “deaf knowledge” because 
I do not intend to be recognized first as deaf. Deafness is part of my identifications, 
but it is not something with which I have a main identification. However, if my deaf-
ness is the “stigma” in evidence, people tend to take it as my “primary identity”. This 
intrinsic characteristic of my body obscured my other political subjectivities: being a 
woman and lesbian. The ableist and hetero-cis-normative social structure generally 
tends to contribute to this disappearance, to the extent that society only sees me as 
deaf. Deafness is my first queer experience, but it was the consciencia mestiza (Anz-
aldúa, 1987), not “Deaf consciousness”, that allowed me to go beyond the deafness 
so I can move “constantly out of crystallized formations” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 706).
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My deaf body is mediated by a machine, the so-called cochlear implant, a highly 
sophisticated technology to enhance hearing ability in a more effective way than 
an ordinary hearing aid. In a human-machine interface, in the terms of Haraway 
(1987), the cochlear implant deaf-hybridization could be thought of as a counter 
power to the “Deaf Pride”, with the motto inscribed “Bionic Ear Pride”. Consider-
ing cybernetics as “the art of ensuring the effectiveness of an action” (Couffignal, 
1968: 23), I propose to think the cochlear implant-deaf relationship under these 
cyber effects when the cochlear implant as a “foreign agent” ensures the deaf body’s 
effectiveness of mechanical ability to listen. Here the cyborgization process is con-
figured in construction be deaf in connection with a cochlear implant, performing 
social measures, since both are involved in the same ratios.
In 1998 I had the first contact with the theoretical assumptions of the Deaf 
Studies from reading academic texts in Portuguese on “Deaf identities”. In my view, 
these texts are filled with “accusatory categories”, the sorting of deaf people into 
various categories of deaf identities being counterproductive because it split us into 
“good deaf ” and “bad deaf ”. Good deaf would the Deaf with letter “d” uppercase, 
those who communicate and have sign language as their first language, being fans 
of “Pride Deaf ”. The “bad deaf ” would be the “oral deaf ” and users of the Portu-
guese language as a first language in Brazil, those who speak, do lip-reading and use 
“hearing technologies”.
The talking, lip reading and “hearing technologies” of cochlear implants are con-
sidered by the “good deaf ” as “things of hearing people” and therefore should be 
rejected. Although I don’t subscribe to these ideas “in these terms”,  it is true that 
the hearing-deaf relationship does not cease to be a relationship majority-minority, 
where inequality is also evident through communication and the ability to hear. In 
this sense, just as the “white privilege” or racism against blacks and the “male privi-
lege” or sexism against women can be, respectively, systems of oppression based on 
race/ethnicity and gender, the “hearing privilege” or audism against deaf people can 
be understood as a system of oppression based on hearing ability (Eckert & Rowley, 
2013; Ha’am, 2017). However, regarding the cochlear implant, as cybernetic pros-
thesis it is treated by many Brazilians Deaf with some disgust, a “bad thing”, almost 
automatically a “negative experience” to be avoided, often without considering sub-
jective aspects involved in each particular situation and that demand in a continuous 
exercise of relativity.
If sexuality in human life is a subjective meaning variable in different cultures, so 
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I can say the subjectivity of cochlear implant-deaf experience. One of the powerful 
dimensions of the cyborg and queer/crip experience with cochlear implants are the 
sounds of sex we produce and heard during the sexual relations. There are reports 
of physical disabled people that show how some erotic-sexual nuances and seduction 
mechanisms are designed from their wheelchairs, sometimes in a sensual dance or as 
extension of their disabled bodies in sexual and/or erotic games practices (Oliveira, 
2016). But reports of the sexual practices of deaf people are scarce, especially when 
they involve the use of cochlear implants. This difficulty is due to the fact that deaf-
ness be, at first sight, an “invisible disability”, i.e. the “surface” the deaf body does not 
present “deformed” to be considered worthy of reflexivity in the field of the dissident 
sexualities. There is a gradation of disability, or “crip hierarchies” of disabled bodies, 
with the deaf body very close to the first level of the hierarchy. 
In fact, for many cochlear implant users this technology has become an ingredient 
to more sexual satisfaction. They like to make love with cochlear implant, because 
they love to hear the sounds of sex. Thus, listening may come to represent a very 
particular positive dimension of subjective experience of deaf people with cochlear 
implants. In my case, it is not different. Making love with cochlear implant affects my 
libido, greatly changing the sexual scripts, once I stop to discover and actively par-
ticipate in the sounds present in seduction games in bed. So my cochlear implant is a 
fetish, affectionately treated as sex toy. My cochlear implant, my crip sex toy. This is 
one of the reasons why those Deaf who have never experienced a cochlear implant 
can’t and should not refer to it as a “bad thing”. Sex with cochlear implant is also a 
powerful experience because of the subjectivity of each subject. However, as in any 
experience of the subject, the subjectification of the cochlear implant should not do 
without the subjective position of the subject, i.e. the experience with a cochlear 
implant is tributary of the subjective position of the deaf person.
 Final considerations
Sully has dreams in which their freedom is to fly over heavy trees canopies. 
Dream of freedom in his narrative are contrasted by his image among the people 
of a planet Earth with no future. Sully does not see his disabled body as a cre-
ative power. The former paraplegic Marine believes that in his life there is a hole 
and what it lacks is in his life before the accident. This fetish returns to a previous 
alleged bodily life, in a way, is the same fetish encouraged by rehabilitative historic 
speech that Henri-Jacques Stiker (1999: 122) comments hold its reference to a “[...] 
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assumed prior, the normal state.” Stiker continues to state that
this iterative term to designate the rehabilitation initiative, especially from the 
1920s onward, is remarkable in its own right. It is applied to congenital cases as 
well as the adventitious. It implies returning to a point, to a prior situation, the 
situation that existed for the able, but one only postulated for the others (Stiker, 
1999, loc. cit.).
It is this will to walk again that animates Jake Sully for much of the film narra-
tive and his plotting against the Na’vi. It is for this same freedom that walking again 
is symbolic and seduces Sully to use as avatar the powerful Na’vi body created “in 
vitro”. A disabled, paraplegic, Jake Sully works as the foundation of other forms of 
knowledge and access to inhuman information at the same time he needs to be both 
dismissive and overprotected. This is precisely one of the points that makes us think 
in an analytical queer/crip of disability.
We all know that Jake Sully, when using the Na’vi body remains with his human 
body in a broadcasting room. If his human body suffers any damage, the experience 
of using the body as Na’vi Avatar fails. However, only we realize such fragility of 
the human body condition when in a deadly struggle, while immersed in Avatar, 
the cabin in which lies the body of Sully is broken. The former soldier is vulnerable 
to the toxic gas moon Pandora and its Avatar goes off when the human lungs can’t 
breathe. One of the most beautiful scenes of the film, we see the warrior Neytiri, 
with its slender, blue-bulk, holding in her lap, in comparison, the small body of her 
beloved, almost dead. This is where we have our “able-bodied epiphany” when the 
end of the movie to recognize that Jake Sully survived and become the Omaticaya 
clan hero, his dying body to be left out, “discarded”.
The crip theory critique to the notion of a “complete physical capability” seems 
to cross an analysis of normalization that results, for instance, from the misunder-
standing of what constitutes a queer analysis about the relation between homopho-
bia and compulsory heterosexuality. One might see that as a result from the fact that 
the problematizing towards physically able bodies did not strongly benefit from the 
intersection among categories such as sexuality, race, ethnicity, and disability - in 
the sense of a “sexualization/racialization of disability” or a “disabling of sexuality 
and race” whereas queer theory itself relies on an intersectional approach to discuss 
the sexualization of race and the racialization of sexuality.
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Crip theory questions the normalization of bodies. It questions the exclusion of 
ableism as intersectional discrimination matrix in the feminist and queer theories. 
It questions the “compulsory able-bodiedness” because it is socially and culturally 
marked by a “hierarchy of corporealities” in which to “dwell in the world” (Butler, 
1990) certain bodies seem to be “more acceptable”, “selected” or “privileged” that 
others. By questioning a hierarchy of bodies, the crip theory necessarily covers the 
size of non-hegemonic sexualities. Thus, queer theorists must or should know about 
crip theory, since queer theory relates to a “crip hierarchy” of queer bodies. 
We also have a doubly tensioned, divided experience: we are seen by the “north-
erners” as the “global south”, the “third world,” “subalternized localities in global 
political economy,” and it seems that in many ways we have to recognize ourselves in 
these terms. At the same time, we are often seen by other compatriots as the “aca-
demic north”15: “very theoretical,” “with research resources,” and “with full academ-
ically activism conditions.” Paradoxically, it is precisely because of this our hybrid 
condition that we are generalized as from the south (global) and from the north 
(national) that our critical power resides to produce a southern crip thinking.
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Notas
1. This term lies critically on to the obligation of women to undergo a heterosexual relationship 
and maternity.
2. Going further, crip theory aligns with the premises of symmetrical anthropology, since the sym-
metrical thinking point of departures the construction of a conceptual apparatus that reconfigures 
anthropology and for it uses concepts that overcome dualistic renderings of the world, such as 
network, symmetry, multinaturalism, relationship.
3. Free translation.
4. This long braid works as “nerve terminal” for communication, transmission and sharing of fee-
lings, practices and traditional knowledge among the Na’vi and their ancestors, the animals, plants, 
in short, everything that exists in Pandora.
5. Free translation.
6. The Na’vi preserve their beliefs, customs and traditions and are religiously attached to their land, 
considered the abode of their goddess Eywa. In this sense, in Pandora everything and everyone is 




10. For a good introductory text on perspectivism, see Bruno Latour (2009).
11. Note: in Brazilian Portuguese language, “cadeirante” does not have the same sense of “whee-
lchair user” in English. “Cadeirante” is a native category widely used in Brazil. “Wheelchair user” 
may be translated in Portuguese as “usuário de cadeira de rodas” as if the chair were separated from 
the person. Already “cadeirante” is the embodiment of the chair to the person. Thus, the term 
“cadeirante” combines and transforms the chair and the person into a single thing, as a cyborg. In 
this sense, the chair is a person because it’s an extension of the user’s body.
12. Regarding other ruptures mentioned by Haraway that erupt through the cyborg are: the bre-
aking of the modern western boundaries between ‘human and animals’ and within the limits of the 
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‘physical and non-physical’. For a feminist-queer-crip analysis of this work of Haraway and some 
of its developments in Disability Studies, see Kafer (2013:103-128)
13. See too Eli Clare (2001, p. 361): “Let me begin with my body, my disabled queer body. I use 
the word queer in both of its meanings: in its general sense, as odd, quirky, not belonging; and in 
its specific sense, as referring to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender identity. In my life, these 
two meanings have often merged into one. Queer is not a taunt to me, but an apt descriptive word. 
My first experience of queerness centered not on sexuality or gender, but on disability. Early on, 
I understood my body to be irrevocably different from those of my neighbors, playmates, siblings. 
Shaky: off-balance; speech hard to understand; a body that moved slow, wrists cocked at odd 
angles, muscles knotted with tremors. […] Only later came gender and sexuality. Again I found 
my body to be irrevocably different.”
14. Free translation
15. And here the inversion of the north-south poles occurs in the regional geopolitics of Brazil, 
where the “southern states”, represented by the south, are more economically and politically 
“evolved” than the “northern states,” represented by the northern and northeastern regions
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Facts of cripness to the Brazilian: dia-
logues with Avatar, the film
Abstract: The influence of queer 
theory on the humanities is also reflected 
in disability studies, contributing to the 
emergence of crip theory. While the main 
axiom of queer theory postulates that 
contemporary society is governed by het-
ero-cis-normativity, crip theory is sup-
ported by the socially constructed postu-
late of compulsory able-bodiedness that 
is not very sensitive to the body’s diver-
sity. The translation of the term crip into 
the category of crippled in Portuguese 
(i.e. aleijado) is a way of giving the same 
sense of the word in English, indicating 
an area reserved for people with disabil-
ities. Considering that gay and lesbian 
studies initially focused their investiga-
tions on the question of homosexuality 
being a “natural” or “unnatural” behavior, 
remaining within a binary logic, queer 
theory expands the investigative focus by 
encompassing any kind of sexual practice 
or identity that circumscribes normative 
or deviant categories. From this perspec-
tive, disabled bodies are also queer. The 
objective of this work is to discuss the 
analytical and intersectional potential of 
a queer/crip epistemology in the consti-
tution of disability experience from the 
“global south”, based on autoethnographic 
accounts and analysis of the Avatar movie.
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Fatos da aleijadice à brasileira: diálogos com 
Avatar, o filme
Resumo: A influência da teoria queer 
nas humanidades também se refletiu nos 
estudos sobre deficiência, contribuindo 
para a emergência da teoria crip. A teoria 
queer postula que a sociedade contem-
porânea é regida pela hetero-cis-norma-
tividade, enquanto na teoria crip a crítica 
está no postulado da corponormatividade 
de nossa estrutura social pouco sensível 
à diversidade corporal. A tradução do 
termo crip para aleijado em português 
é uma forma de dar o mesmo sentido da 
palavra em inglês, desvelando a zona de 
abjeção reservada às pessoas com defici-
ência. Considerando que os estudos gays 
e lésbicos inicialmente focaram suas inves-
tigações na questão da homossexualidade 
ser um comportamento “natural” ou “anti-
natural”, permanecendo dentro de uma 
lógica binária, a teoria queer expande o 
foco investigativo ao abarcar qualquer 
tipo de prática sexual ou identidade que 
estejam na fronteira de categorias norma-
tivas ou desviantes. Desde essa perspec-
tiva, os corpos deficientes também são 
queer. O objetivo deste trabalho é discu-
tir, a partir de relatos autoetnográficos e 
da análise do filme Avatar, o potencial ana-
lítico e intersecional de uma epistemolo-
gia queer/crip na constituição da experi-
ência da deficiência desde o “sul global”.
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